The existing literature on …rm survival focuses almost exclusively on …rm-and industry-level determinants. What is generally overlooked, albeit extremely important for …rm survival in developing countries, is the impact of institutional quality. Using data from manufacturing …rms in China for the 1998-2005 period, we …nd that institutional quality has a signi…cant and positive impact on the survival of private enterprises. Speci…cally, a one-standard-deviation increase in the security of property rights protection (the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement) leads to a 9.65 (6.2) percent decrease in the hazard rate of private enterprises. Our results are robust to the inclusion of both …rm-and industry-level determinants and to various checks, such as alternative measures of institutional quality, di¤erent sub-samples, and di¤erent estimation methods.
Introduction
"State …rms (in transition economies), fearing competition, harass the new …rms, and corrupt bureaucrats extort bribes. Without the normal market supporting institutions, the new …rms usually cannot rely on the courts to enforce their contracts"(McMillan and Woodru¤, 2002: 154).
The survival of newly established …rms brings competitive pressure to bear on incumbent …rms, thereby ensuring the quality of economic growth. At the same time, such survival also a¤ects the level of future entrepreneurial activities and, hence, further economic growth. Re ‡ecting the importance of new …rm survival, there is a large body of literature examining its various determinants. Most of the existing studies in this area focus on …rm-and industry-level factors using data from developed countries. 1 However, as suggested by the foregoing quote, the survival of newly established …rms in developing countries, where economic institutions including property rights protection and contract enforcement are imperfect, clearly depends on the quality of these economic institutions.
2 Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, there is no formal study investigating the impact of institutional quality on …rm survival, presumably because most of the existing studies use data from developed countries, where the quality of economic institutions is sound, with little variation across countries and regions. In this paper, we …ll this void in the literature by examining the impacts of economic institutions on …rm survival using data from China.
Over the past 30 years, China has experienced spectacular economic growth, in which the emergence and survival of newly established …rms has played a crucial role Li, Feng and Jiang, 2006) . However, it has been widely documented that the quality of economic institutions, speci…cally, de facto property rights protection and contract enforcement, varies signi…cantly across China's regions despite the country being a unitary state with uniform de jure laws (Du, Lu and Tao, 2008; Lu and Tao, 2009 ). Thus, China o¤ers an ideal setting in which to examine the impact of institutional quality on …rm survival. Our cross-regional study also has some advantage over cross-country studies because there is no need to control for the impacts of the political system, culture and language, or corporate tax policies all of which may vary dramatically across countries.
Moreover, in the case of China, the impact of institutional quality on …rm survival is expected to be more pronounced for private enterprises than for state-owned enterprises. Despite 30 years of economic reform, China still retains a signi…cant share of state ownership as the cornerstone of its socialist market economy (Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People's Congress of China, speaking at the fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress on March 10, 2011). More importantly, throughout the course of China's economic reform, there has been an ideological bias against private sector development. Indeed, private enterprises were not even formally permitted to exist until 1988, 10 years after the country initiated its economic reform. As a result, private enterprises have been subject to the expropriation of their property rights and discrimination in the legal enforcement of contracts with trading partners, whereas state-owned enterprises have continued to enjoy their favored son status and the ability to circumvent imperfect economic institutions. We thus expect institutional quality to exert a more signi…cant impact on the survival of new private enterprises relative to their state-owned counterparts.
Our data come from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms, conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, for the 1998-2005 period. There were altogether 4,793 …rms newly established in 1998, for which we trace their survival throughout the remainder of the sample period. Following the literature, we use the COX proportional hazard model to estimate the impacts of institutional quality on …rm survival while controlling for the …rm-and industry-level factors reported in the literature. Speci…cally, our dependent variable is the number of years of survival of a …rm that was newly established in 1998. Our key independent variables relate to the quality of economic institutions. Following the literature (e.g., Johnson, McMillan, and Woodru¤, 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005) , we measure property rights protection as the risk of expropriation by government agencies and related parties, and speci…cally construct it as the percentage of extralegal payments to the government (Tan Pai in Chinese) in a …rm's total revenue, aggregated to the regional level, using data from the Survey of China's Private Enterprises. The e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement is measured by the likelihood of …rms using courts to resolve their business disputes, which is also constructed using data from the Survey of China's Private Enterprises and aggregated to the regional level.
We …nd that quality of economic institutions has a positive and statistically signi…cant impact on the survival of private …rms but no impact on that of state-owned enterprises, i.e., "bad" institutions decrease the proba-bility of survival for private …rms but not for their state-owned counterparts. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-standard-deviation decrease in the security of property rights protection increases the hazard rate of private …rms by 8.73 percentage points, while a one-standard-deviation decrease in the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement increases the hazard rate of private …rms by 6.04 percentage points. Our results are robust to various checks, such as alternative measures of institutional quality, di¤erent sub-samples, and di¤erent estimation methods. This paper is related to both the literature on …rm survival and that on economic institutions. Its contribution to the …rm survival literature lies in its identi…cation of the importance of economic institutions to …rm survival, which is particularly relevant for the developing economies. The study also contributes to the economic institutions literature by highlighting a speci…c channel, i.e., the survival of newly established …rms, through which institutional quality a¤ects economic growth. In particular, a lower survival rate for newly established …rms due to poorer economic institutions results in less competitive pressure on incumbent …rms and fewer entrepreneurial activities, both of which adversely a¤ect economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Data and variables are described in Section 2, while the main empirical results are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
Data and Variables
Our data come from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms, conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, for the period of 1998 to 2005. The survey covers all state-owned …rms, as well as non-state-owned …rms with annual sales of RMB 5 million (US$ 770,000) or more. The number of observations ranges from 164,980 in 1998 to 265,718 in 2005. The data contain year of establishment, …rm identi…cation, and operation and performance information extracted from balance sheets and income statements.
Following the literature (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995), we de…ne …rm entry by a …rm's year of establishment. Specifically, we focus on the survival of …rms established in the …rst year of our sample period, i.e., 1998. There are a total of 5,321 …rms established in 1998. After deleting those …rms that lack the information required to construct the key …rm-level variables such as employment, debt, total assets, and gross value added, we are left with a …nal sample of 4,793 …rms that were newly established in 1998. Next, following the same literature, we trace the survival of these …rms by their presence in the dataset (using …rm identi…cation information) in the subsequent years of the sample period, and construct the dependent variable of this study, Survival (denoted by t), as the number of consecutive years the …rm appearing in the sample.
Speci…cally, this variable takes a value of 1 for those …rms disappearing in 1999, a value of 2 for those appearing consecutively in the years from 1998 to 1999, but disappearing in 2000, and so on. For …rms appearing throughout the entire sample period, we follow the literature by assigning them a value of 7, thus implying that our dependent variable is right-censored (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez and Marchenko, 2008).
Our key independent variables concern the quality of economic institutions, which include property rights protection and contract enforcement. , we measure property rights protection as the risk of expropriation by government agencies and related parties. Speci…cally, it is one minus the percentage of revenue spent on extralegal payments to the government (Tan Pai in Chinese), the information of which is obtained from the Survey of China's Private Enterprises 3 , and then aggregated to the regional level. A higher value of this variable, denoted by Property Rights Protection, indicates better property rights protection. Meanwhile, we measure the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement as the likelihood of …rms using the courts to resolve business disputes. This variable, denoted by Contract Enforcement, is constructed using …rms'replies to a survey question concerning "whether an enterprise would resort to the courts if it encountered an economic dispute" in the Survey of China's Private Enterprises, and then aggregated to the regional level, with a higher value of this variable indicating better contract enforcement. For robustness checks, we use an alternative measure of property rights protection. It is the proportion of private entrepreneurs in a region answering "Yes"to a question concerning whether it is necessary for the region to have stricter policies against government corruption", with a higher value of this variable (denoted by Government Corruption) indicating poorer property rights protection. We also use the proportion of a¢ rmative replies to a question concerning "whether it is essential for a region to improve business law and order" as an alternative measure of contract enforcement, with a higher value of this variable (denoted by Law and Order) indicating weaker contract enforcement.
As discussed in the Introduction, the impacts of institutional quality on …rm survival are expected to be di¤erent for private and state-owned enterprises due to the ideological bias against the former throughout the period of China's economic reform. Hence in our empirical investigation, we divide our sample into two subsamples: one comprising state-owned enterprises (all …rms whose reported ownership type is state-owned), and the other comprising all remaining types of enterprises (i.e., private enterprises).
As previously noted, all state-owned enterprises are included in the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, whereas only private enterprises with annual sales of RMB 5 million or more are included. In other words, di¤erent cuto¤ points are used for the survival of state-owned and private enterprises. However, this di¤erence is not a problem in our study, as we are comparing the …rm survival of the same types of enterprises (either state-owned or private) across regions, where the quality of economic institutions varies. Moreover, as a robustness check, we use the same cuto¤ point of RMB 5 million in sales revenue for both state-owned and private enterprises, and …nd that our results remain robust.
Although the focus of this study is on the impact of institutional quality on …rm survival, we also control for a host of variables found to be important to …rm survival in the literature. Speci…cally, we control for such …rm-level variables 4 as Start-up Size, Debt Equity Ratio, Capital Labor Ratio, and Labor Productivity and such industry-level variables 5 as Entry Rate, Total Innovation Rate, Small Firm Innovation Rate, Industry Wage, Her…ndahl Index, Industry Growth, Agglomeration, Minimum E¢ cient Scale, and Suboptimal Scale. Finally, as it is di¢ cult to exhaust all industry-level variables (i.e., to completely avoid the possibility of omitted variables bias), as a robustness check we employ industry dummies at the 4-digit level instead of the aforementioned industry-level variables to alleviate the concern of omitted variables bias. Table 1 provides the de…nitions of our …rm-and industrylevel variables.
The summary statistics of all the key variables are presented in Table  2 . Our dependent variable, Survival, has a mean value of 3:954 years with a standard deviation of 2:314 years. The independent variables of interest -that is, the various measures of property rights protection and contract enforcement -all exhibit large variations across regions.
Empirical Analysis

Main Results
Note that our sample is right-censored, as we cannot identify how long the …rms still surviving in 2005 (the last year of our sample) will last into the future, and simply assign value of their Survival to be 7 years. In this case, the ordinary least squares estimation method would produce upwardly biased results (Huynh, Petrunia and Voia, 2010) . Following the literature, we employ the Cox proportional hazard model to investigate the determinants of survival conditional upon their survival up to year t, with the following speci…cation:
where h(t) represents the hazard rate of …rm survival (i.e., the probability of death) in the next time period conditional upon the …rm's survival up to year t; h 0 (t) is the baseline hazard; X is a vector of covariates, including the …rm-and industry-level variables found to be important in the literature; and, lastly, Institutional Quality is the main independent variable of interest in this study, and includes either Property Rights Protection or Contract Enforcement. In this model, the change in a determinant of …rm survival, say, institutional quality, has an impact on …rm survival that is proportional to the baseline hazard (i.e., h 0 (t)), with a positive sign for indicating a higher hazard rate for …rm survival. As suggested by Cox (1972) , equation (1) is estimated using the partial likelihood method. For our main analysis, we allow baseline hazard h 0 (t) to be of any form. For a robustness check, we employ the Weibull parametric model, i.e., h 0 (t) is assumed to follow Weibull distribution h 0 (t) = ( t)
1 ; where and are some ancillary shape parameters estimated from the data (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez and Marchenko, 2008). As our key explanatory variables are at the regional level, in all of our model speci…cations, white-robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level to deal with possible heteroskedasticity. Table 3 summarizes the regression results with regard to the impact of property rights protection on …rm survival, with the left panel presenting those for state-owned enterprises and the right panel those for private enterprises. For the subsample of state-owned enterprises, the coe¢ cient of Property Rights Protection is at …rst negative and signi…cant, but then becomes statistically insigni…cant when the …rm-and industry-level variables/industry dummies are included (Columns 1-4, Table 3 ). In contrast, for the subsample of private enterprises, the coe¢ cient of Property Rights Protection is always negative and statistically signi…cant (Columns 5-8, Table 3 ). These results imply that poorer property rights protection has an adverse impact on the survival of private enterprises, but no impact at all on that of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the magnitude of the impact of property rights protection on the survival of private enterprises is signi…cant, with a one-standarddeviation increase in the security of property rights protection leading to a 9.65 percent decrease in the hazard rate of private enterprises.
The corresponding results for the impact of contract enforcement are shown in Table 4 . Similarly to the aforementioned results for the property rights protection, the coe¢ cient of Contract Enforcement is at …rst negative and signi…cant for state-owned enterprises, but then loses its statistical signi…cance when additional control variables are added. In contrast this coe¢ cient remains negative and signi…cant in the case of private enterprises. These results imply that weaker contract enforcement has an adverse impact on the survival of private enterprises, but no impact at all on that of state-owned counterparts. Furthermore, the magnitude of that impact on the survival of the former is large, with a one-standard-deviation increase in the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement giving rise to a 6.2 percent decrease in the hazard rate of private enterprises.
Although the focus of this study is the impacts of institutional quality on …rm survival, we also control for the …rm-and industry-level variables found to be important in the literature. Speci…cally, larger and better capitalendowed start-ups are more likely to survive for both private enterprises and state-owned enterprises, consistent with the results reported by Mata, Portugal, and Guimaraes (1995), and Agarwal and Audretsch (2001). In addition, labor productivity is found to exert a positive impact on the survival of private enterprises, which is consistent with the literature, but to exert no e¤ect on that of state-owned enterprises. One explanation is that China's stateowned enterprises are incentivized by the government to provide employment and maintain social stability in exchange for receiving subsidies, and hence there is a muted relationship between labor productivity and …rm survival In summary, we …nd that poor-quality regional institutions (in terms of both property rights protection and contract enforcement) reduce the survival rate of private enterprises but have on e¤ect on state-owned enterprises.
Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we report the results of a series of robustness checks carried out to address various concerns about our estimation.
First, to check whether our results are due to the speci…c ways we measured institutional quality, we employ an alternative measure of property rights protection (Government Corruption) and an alternative measure of contract enforcement (Law and Order). As shown in Table 5 , our …ndings are robust to these alternative measures of institutional quality.
Second, we carry out robustness checks using various subsamples to ensure that our results are not driven by observations in certain special regions of China or the statistical coverage of the data. (i) We delete observations from the western part of China, 6 where economic institutions are known to be much poorer than those in the rest of China. As shown in Table 6 , our main results remain robust to this exercise. (ii) We delete observations from the three northeastern provinces of China (Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin), where state-owned enterprises are dominant as a legacy of the centrally planned economy. As shown in Table 8 , our results are also robust to this exercise. (iii) As discussed earlier, all state-owned enterprises are included in the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms, whereas only private enterprises with RMB 5 million or more in sales are included. In this robustness check, we use the same cuto¤ point for the statistical coverage (RMB 5 million in sales) for both types of enterprises, and …nd that our results remain robust (Table 8) .
Finally, it should be noted that aforementioned results are all from the semi-parametric estimations of the Cox proportional hazard model in which h 0 (t) can be of any form. For a robustness check, we follow the literature in assuming a particular form of h 0 (t), speci…cally, the Weibull distribution, and carry out the parametric estimation of speci…cation (1) . As shown in Table 9 , our earlier results regarding the impacts of economic institutions remain robust to this alternative estimation method. That is, the survival of private enterprises is adversely a¤ected by institutional quality (including property rights protection and contract enforcement), but such quality has no e¤ect on state-owned enterprises.
Conclusion
The survival of newly established …rms is of signi…cant importance to economic growth, as such …rms exert competitive pressure on existing producers and their survival unleashes even more entrepreneurial activities in the future. Indeed, there is a large body of literature examining the …rm-and industry-level determinants of …rm survival, most of which employ data from developed countries. However, there is an even more pressing need to bet-ter understand the determinants of …rm survival in developing countries, as these countries seek to grow their economies and catch up with their developed counterparts. Arguably, what distinguishes developed countries from developing countries is the quality of their economic institutions. It is thus expected that institutional quality is an important determinant of …rm survival in developing countries, if not more important than the …rm-and industry-level determinants of …rm survival.
This paper contributes to the literature by being the …rst to examine the impact of institutional quality on …rm survival using data from manufacturing …rms in China for the period of 1998-2005. Utilizing the signi…cant cross-regional variations in the quality of economic institutions, we …nd that institutional quality does indeed have a signi…cant and positive impact on the survival of private enterprises, but no impact on that of state-owned enterprises. The di¤erential impacts of institutional quality on …rm survival between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises is due to China's gradual reform from a socialist economy to a market economy and the lingering ideological bias against the development of private enterprises, under which state-owned enterprises still retain their favored son status and have the ability to circumvent imperfect economic institutions. The importance of institutional quality to the survival of private enterprises points to the need to improve economic institutions in China and in other developing countries. Ratio of output contributed by new products in firms with 500 employees or less to total employment of those firms Agglomeration
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